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Abstract
Studies pertaining to election systems have historically identified paper-based voting
systems as better performing than most voting system alternatives. Despite this, there is a
lack of literature exploring the use of paper ballots from an in-depth perspective. This
study investigates different metrics of ballot length (i.e., words, questions, selections,
pages, sheets, and bilingual) and how they impact voting errors (i.e., machine-based
errors, human-machine interaction errors, and ballot marking errors) during the 2018
Midterm election in Rhode Island. Logistic regression models are developed to measure
the relationship between ballot length and voting errors while controlling for municipal
and precinct level demographics. The findings indicate that areas with longer ballots and
urban areas significantly increase the odds of encountering voting errors. Among the
most contributing measures are the number ballot pages, the number of local questions,
and the number of candidate selections allowed on a ballot. These factors significantly
increased the odds of experiencing voting errors, in some cases as high as 160%. The
statewide impact of these errors is presented and opportunities for future work are shared.
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Preface
This thesis is written in a format for submission to the Journal of Electoral
Studies. There is no strictly required format, so the Author’s Guide states the following:
“Formatting requirements: There are no strict formatting requirements but
all manuscripts must contain the essential elements needed to convey your
manuscript, for example Abstract, Keywords, Introduction, Materials and
Methods, Results, Conclusions, Artwork and Tables with Captions. If your
article includes any Videos and/or other Supplementary material, this
should be included in your initial submission for peer review purposes.
Divide the article into clearly defined sections,” (Electoral Studies
Author’s Guide, 2019).
Therefore, this thesis follows a general manuscript format with page layout following that
required by the URI Masters Thesis guide.
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Beginning of the Manuscript “Quantification of Voting Error: The 2018 Rhode Island
Midterms”
This manuscript is prepared for submission to the Journal of Electoral Studies.
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Introduction
Throughout the United States (U.S.), as of 2016, 47% of registered voters lived in a
precinct that utilized optical or digital ballot scanners with an additional 19% of voters
living in precincts that utilize both direct recording-electronics (DRE) and optical/digital
ballot scanning devices (DeSilver, 2016). These statistics indicate that 74 million voters,
in 2016, cast a ballot on an optical/digital ballot scanner while another 29.9 million used
either a DRE or an optical/digital scanner (Census Bureau, 2018). These voting systems
also continue to show prevalence as institutions encourage the development of Voter
Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) compatible systems, of which paper-based ballot
scanners show promise (Hall, 2006; Goggin, Byrne, Gilbert, Rogers, and McClendon,
2008). With such an overarching reach within the election system, optical/digital ballot
scanners are a key piece of voting equipment to be investigated. These devices indicate
when errors occur on a per-ballot sheet basis, indicating that a voter may have selected too
many candidates (overvote), generated unreadable marks, or experienced difficulties when
interacting with the ballot scanner, all of which have the potential of causing long lines
within polling locations and disenfranchising voters.

Having access to this error

information allows for an assessment of the current state of election systems, as voting
technology in recent history has been blamed for voter disenfranchisement and long lines
in polling locations (Cassidy, Long, Balsamo, 2018; Jackson, 2000; Levine, 2008). Many
states utilize paper ballots and digital ballot scanning devices, exclusively (e.g., Alabama,
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Rhode Island); thus, with access to ballot scanner data (i.e., log
files) and corresponding ballots (i.e., ballot characteristics), an investigation of voting
errors associated with ballot scanning can occur.
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This article presents an analysis that utilizes data generated by ballot scanners and
ballot characteristics. Relationships between ballot length and voting errors are identified
while controlling for municipal level and precinct level demographics, exploring the impact
that ballot length has on voting errors in paper-based voting systems. To summarize the
goals of this article, the following research questions are presented:
R1: Does ballot length impact the odds of encountering a voting error?
R2: If so, how does ballot length impact the odds of encountering a voting error?

Literature Review
Research on voting errors and ballot characteristics has been conducted from several
perspectives throughout voting machine and ballot design literature, although the measure
of voting error often differs between studies. Lacking a formal definition, “voting error” is
classified in the literature as unrecorded votes (Kimball & Kropf, 2003; Kimball & Kropf,
2005; Acemyan, Kortum, Byrne, & Wallach, 2015), roll-off (Reilly & Richey, 2011),
residual votes (Ansolabehere & Stewart, 2005; Alvarez, Beckett, & Stewart, 2011),
unintentional undervotes and unintentional candidate selection (Herrnson, Hanmer, &
Niemi, 2012; Brady, 2000), or purely undervotes (Schocket, Heighberger, & Brown, 1992;
Bullock & Hood, 2002). One commonality between these definitions is that the errors are
observed after the voting process takes place with no potential for correction, presenting a
focus on the impact of errors on election results. A different perspective that goes largely
unconsidered is the impact on voters themselves. Examining ballot scanner log files
identifies that there are many more types of errors that can occur while marking and
scanning a ballot that may not always impact election results but impact the time a voter
spends in a polling location. Thus “voting error” in this paper is defined as errors that occur
3

during the ballot marking (i.e., marking) and scanning process (i.e., human-machine
interaction and machine) as observed by the ballot scanner. While there are many potential
causes of voting errors, the potential impact of many ballot characteristics has not been
investigated.
Like voting errors, ballot characteristics have many definitions in ballot design
literature. Studies that investigate ballot characteristics consider the complexity of ballot
questions (Reilly & Richey, 2011; Milita, 2017), graphic design principles (e.g., the use of
bolding, shading, positioning of questions and candidates) (Kimball & Kropf, 2005), and
ballot format (e.g., bubble ballots, connect the arrow ballots, punch card ballots, digital
ballots) (Herrnson, Hanmer, & Niemi, 2012; Bullock & Hood, 2002; Alvarez, Beckett, &
Stewart, 2013; Ansolabehere & Stewart, 2005; Shocket, Heighberger, & Brown, 1992).
Another ballot characteristic that has been investigated is ballot length (i.e., the number of
questions on a ballot) which increased the variability of a voter’s propensity to respond
‘yes’ or ‘no’ on Swiss referendums (Selb, 2008). While this study did not explicitly
investigate voting error, an effect of ballot length was observed.
While ballot length has been theorized to impact nonresponse rates (i.e., undervotes
and blank ballots) (Walker, 1966; Taebel, 1975), little is known about its effects on other
types of voting errors (e.g., ballot scanner errors, marking errors). Anecdotally, Elections
Officials consider ballot length to be a likely cause of voting errors and literature identifies
some effect on voter response variability (Selb, 2008). Despite these implications, direct
effects of ballot length on roll-off are found to be insignificant (Reilly & Richey, 2011).
Limited studies investigate the impact of ballot length in real elections and those that do
consider only a partial measure of ballot length (e.g., word count) (Reilly & Richey, 2011).
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The distinct differences in these bodies of work indicate that there is a need for more
investigation into the impacts of ballot length on elections, especially with respect to
understanding voting error in a real election.
The literature investigating ballot length has conflicting findings regarding its impact
on voting. The work of Selb (2008), being one of the few works focusing exclusively on
ballot length, identifies that there is in fact some impact of ballot length on elections.
However, the study performed in Selb (2008) focusses on Swiss elections and utilizes
simulated results. To gain a better understanding of the impact of ballot length, a real
Midterm election is investigated. Voting errors are utilized as a proxy for election impact,
as they present a cause of delays and voter disenfranchisement in voting systems for
individual voters.
H1: Longer ballots lead to an increase in the odds of voting error occurrences.
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Methodology
The 2018 Rhode Island and Providence Plantations Midterm election was assessed on
the municipal level and precinct level to explore the impact of ballot length on the odds of
voting errors. Data collected from ballot scanner (DS200) log files, sample ballots, and the
American Community Survey (ACS) was used to perform four logistic regression models
(i.e., municipal level general model, precinct level general model, municipal level
differentiated model, and precinct level differentiated model). Methods used to clean,
process, and code the datasets are shared in this section. Statistical methods are described
as used throughout the analysis including correlation testing, binary logistic regression, and
multinomial logistic regression. These models are further articulated at the municipal level
and precinct level in the following sections.

Data Collection and Processing
RI was selected for analysis due to the openness of the RI Board of Elections (BOE)
to provide data, as well as due to their methods for running elections. RI is the smallest
state across the U.S. although it is the second most densely populated (“U.S. States by
Density 2019,” 2019). With its small physical size, the RI BOE is able to oversee
elections within each municipality and even within each precinct. The 2018 RI Midterm
experienced a turnout of 381,267 voters (48.4% of registered voters), the second highest
turnout in the last five Midterm elections (AP News, 2018).
Election data were acquired from two sources in the U.S. 2018 Midterm in RI: (i)
ballot scanner log files from digital scanners and (ii) sample ballots. The datasets were
stripped of any potential identifying information prior to leaving the possession of the RI
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BOE. In RI, as well as 32 other states as of 2018, DS200 ballot scanners are utilized to
tabulate paper ballots (U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2018). These digital
scanning devices produce a transaction log file throughout their use which indicates and
records every action that the machine (i.e., DS200) makes. Prior to the 2018 RI Midterm
election, sample ballots were distributed for each precinct across RI, which closely
resembled the official ballot on Election Day. Both DS200 log files and 2018 sample
ballots were provided by the RI BOE and required preprocessing prior to analysis.
A total of 555 ballot scanners were distributed to the 421 precincts during the 2018 RI
Midterm. To obtain information about error occurrences, the DS200 log files generated
from the ballot scanners were exported into a CSV format and stripped of any identifiable
voter information prior to custody. Using a Microsoft Excel package titled BOOTH
Voting Package developed by the RI VOTES Project, the files were cleaned and imported
into workable Excel files from their raw format.
A sample, compiled DS200 log file is presented in Figure 1 for illustration purposes
of the raw data. The average number of lines the machine logged information per the 555
DS200 log files was 2354 with a standard deviation of 1079. Each data file per DS200
log contained the following information, as columns: an event code (an identification
code that corresponds to an event type and description), a date, a timestamp, the
operating mode (i.e., “E” was seen in all files due to it being activated for an election), a
scanner ID number (consistent per log file), the event type, and an event description.
Each row of data directly corresponds to a recorded event within the machine, although
some rows were not necessary for the purposes of this analysis, such as the setup and
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shutdown procedures, and were automatically detected and removed upon the importing
of the data.
Utilizing the event codes, scanning observations (i.e., when a ballot is fully scanned
and processed by the scanner) can be obtained. Successful scans (i.e., when a ballot is
accepted by the scanner) are recorded in the log files by identifying the beginning (i.e.,
“Vote Session Started”; ballot is inserted into the scanner) and end (i.e., “Voting Session
Complete”; when the ballot is counted) of the interaction, as shown in purple in Figure 1.
By identifying the starting and ending codes of scanning observations, an event
description was identified for each corresponding scanning observation, thus identifying
if the scan was error free or otherwise. There are types of scanning observations that
indicated two different types of identification of errors within the sequential lines of
codes: (a) one that would be sandwiched within a “Voting Session Started” and a “Voting
Session Complete” or (b) one that would keep iterating within the system until
completed. Orange boxes in Figure 1 emphasize scanning observations that were
accepted by the voter, meaning that their ballot was cast by them despite the error, and
thus, would have a beginning event, an error event recorded, and an ending event. Green
boxes in Figure 1 highlight scanning observations that contained an error which led to the
ballot being returned to the voter with an error and would not result in the end of the
interaction. The status of the scan was identified as ‘Unsuccessful’ if the ballot was
returned to the voter (Green in Figure 1) or ‘Successful’ if the ballot was accepted by the
scanner (Purple and Orange in Figure 1) (see Appendix A). Due to the anonymity of the
scanning process, the DS200 does not record which sheet of a multi-sheet ballot is being
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processed or where on the ballot errors occur. Ballot length values were therefore taken
as a total per ballot.

Figure 1: Raw DS200 ballot scanner log file. An error free scanning observation is identified by the code
in the purple boxes. The green boxes identify an error that led to a returned ballot. The orange boxes
indicate a scanning observation that contained an error but was accepted by the voter. The underlined
timestamps are used to calculate the duration of the corresponding observation.

The sample ballots used in this analysis were provided in PDF format for each of the
421 precincts in the 2018 RI Midterm (see Appendix B for a 2018 sample ballot). From
these files, measurements of ballot length were determined for each precinct by counting:
the number of sheets (i.e., total number of paper sheets) and pages (i.e., summed number
of sides), the number of questions in total and type (i.e., national, state, local, candidate,
multiple select, referendums), the required number of selections per question, the total
number of words per ballot, and whether a ballot contained multiple language translations
(see Appendix C for a sample compiled data table). Finally, the scanning observation
data and sample ballot data were normalized into a single database by precinct (see
Appendix D for a sample).
Demographic data were obtained from the 2017 5-year American Community Survey
(ACS) at the municipal level across RI and from the 2016 5-year ACS at the precinct
level. Within both the precinct level and municipal level data, the demographics collected
were as follows: median income (‘Median Income’), percent of the population with a
bachelor’s degree or greater (‘Percent College Educated’), and percent of the population
9

that are not white (‘Percent Non-white’). The municipal level data also included
information regarding the percent of the population living in an urban area (‘Urbanicity’).
When considering race and ethnicity, the percent of non-white persons was selected due
to the large Spanish and Portuguese speaking community with a diverse racial
composition in RI. This grouping is more representative of a voting population that may
or may not receive a bilingual ballot format which is federally mandated via the Voting
Rights Act if 5% or more of a municipality’s population speaks a non-English language
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2018).
Seven of the 421 active precincts during the 2018 Midterm election in RI were
removed from the dataset. These seven precincts were changed or newly established after
the 2016 elections, and therefore had no corresponding demographic data in the 2016
ACS.

Coding of Ballot Length Measurements
To analyze the impact of ballot length on voting errors, measurements of ballot
contents are first defined and gathered. Sample ballots contained a combination of three
possible question types: candidate-based questions, state questions, and local questions
(Figure 2).
Of these question types, state questions are consistent throughout RI, while only some
candidate questions are consistent. The ballots distributed during the 2018 Midterm
elections in RI resulted in 39 unique ballots, one for each municipality.
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Figure 2: Sample ballot questions types: Candidate Questions (left), Local
Question (middle), and State Question (right).

The definition of ballot lengths resulted in the following classifications: the number of
pages and/or sides of a ballot with questions listed (‘Pages’), the number of physical sheets
of paper (‘Sheets’), the number of candidate based questions (‘Candidate Questions’), the
number of local questions (‘Local Questions’), the total number of questions (‘Total
Questions’) (Selb, 2008), the maximum number of candidates to be selected (‘Candidate
Select’), the maximum total number of selections (‘Total Select’), and the total word count
of the ballot (‘Total Words’) (Reilly & Richey, 2011). An additional ballot characteristic,
ballot language (‘Bilingual’), is included as it directly impacts ballot length as they contain
questions listed in English followed by the Spanish translation in RI municipalities which
increases the total word count and total space used on a ballot (see Appendix B). The
number of selections to be made on a ballot is differentiated between ‘Candidate Select’
and ‘Total Select’ due to some office races having several positions available (e.g., town
councils, school committees, planning commissions) while other questions, such as
11

referendums, offer only one binary selection opportunity (i.e., approve or reject). The
measure of ‘Total Questions’ is the summation of ‘Candidate Questions’, ‘Local
Questions’, and the statewide questions (three in the 2018 RI Midterm).
To determine which of the proposed measures of ballot length and demographic control
variables are included in the model, correlation tests were performed for all combinations
of variables. The criterion for acceptance is a correlation coefficient less than 0.8 at a
Bonferroni corrected alpha-value of 0.0003 (0.05/158 tests).

Independent Variable Selection
To identify which of the independent variables (i.e., ballot length and demographics)
to include in the model, correlations tests were performed (Tables 1 and 2). Several ballot
length variables were identified as significantly correlated, thus running into six instances
of collinearity.
The measures of ‘Pages’ and ‘Sheets’ had a correlation coefficient of 0.961 (p-value =
0.000). ‘Pages’ was selected to remain in the models as it measures ballot length with more
granularity than ‘Sheets’, as a single ‘Sheet’ can have either one or two ‘Pages’. ‘Total
Words’ also shared a significant correlation coefficient of 0.905 with ‘Pages’. ‘Pages’ was
chosen to remain in the model as the additional ballot pages corresponds with additional
scanning observations per ballot.
‘Total Questions’ and ‘Local Questions’ are also highly correlated with a coefficient of
0.928, as expected, the number of ‘Local Questions’ varies between municipalities and
plays a role in the total number of questions that appear on a ballot. ‘Local Questions’ was
selected to remain in the model due to the exclusion of the number of statewide questions
in its measurement. Another highly correlated pair of ballot length variables was ‘Total
12

Select’ and ‘Candidate Select’ (0.863). ‘Candidate Select’ is selected to remain in the
models due to the potential for multiselect questions in the candidate-based portion of the
ballot, and due to its lower correlation coefficients with the included variables (i.e., ‘Pages’,
‘Candidate Questions’, ‘Local Questions’, and ‘Bilingual’).
The remaining ballot length variables are ‘Candidate Questions’ and ‘Bilingual’. These
variables are included in the model because ‘Candidate Questions’ accounts for the
potential variation in candidate-based questions on ballots from municipality-tomunicipality and ‘Bilingual’ ballots tend to be longer and present questions in a different
format than single language ballots.
Performing the correlation tests for the control variables (i.e., demographic variables)
at the municipal level, shown in Table 1, result in only one collinearity between municipal
level demographics and ballot length variables. The collinearity present is between
‘Bilingual’ and ‘Percent Non-white’ at the municipal level (i.e., correlation coefficient =
0.895 and p-value = 0.000); ‘Percent Non-white’ is chosen to remain in the model over
‘Bilingual’. Among the precinct level demographics, shown in Table 2, no collinearities
are present. Therefore, all precinct level variables are included in both the general model
and the differentiated model.
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Table 1: Correlation matrix for the independent variables measuring ballot length and municipal level demographic variables.

Independent Variables

-

Sheets

0.961

-

Candidate
Questions

0.059

0.040

-

Local
Questions

0.650

0.532

0.263

-

Bilingual

0.585

0.634

-0.163

0.219

-

Total
Questions

0.559

0.455

0.605

0.928

0.118

-

Candidate
Select

0.365

0.415

0.471

0.315

0.046

0.443

-

Total
Select

0.599

0.572

0.468

0.751

0.149

0.801

0.863

-

Total
Words

0.905

0.816

-0.009

0.728

0.603

0.597

0.194

0.522

-

Percent
College
Educated

-0.492 -0.537

-0.065

-0.190

-0.529

0.597

0.102

-0.030

-0.456

-

Median
Income

-0.389 -0.439

0.134

-0.079

-0.742

-0.013

0.180

0.083

-0.382

0.780

-

Urbanicity

0.158

0.172

-0.321

0.153

0.277

0.002

-0.359

-0.168

0.162

-0.174

-0.421

Percent
Non-white

0.415

0.396

-0.160

0.187

0.895

0.093

-0.184

-0.029

0.485

-0.455

-0.760 0.364

Percent
Non-white

Urbanicity

Median
Income

Percent
College
Educated

Total
Words

Total
Select

Candidate
Select

Total
Questions

Bilingual

Local
Questions

Candidate
Questions

Sheets

Pages

Pages

-

All correlations are found to be significant with a p-value < 0.0003. Bolded observations are considered highly correlated (>= |0.8|).
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Table 2: Correlation matrix for the independent variables measuring ballot length and precinct level demographic variables.

Independent Variables

-

Sheets

0.961

-

Candidate
Questions

0.059

0.040

-

Local
Questions

0.650

0.532

0.263

-

Bilingual

0.585

0.634

-0.163

0.219

-

Total
Questions

0.559

0.455

0.605

0.928

0.118

-

Candidate
Select

0.365

0.415

0.471

0.315

0.046

0.443

-

Total
Select

0.599

0.572

0.468

0.751

0.149

0.801

0.863

-

Total
Words

0.905

0.816

-0.009

0.728

0.603

0.597

0.194

0.522

-

Percent
College
Educated

-0.337 -0.375

-0.099

-0.124

-0.283

-0.140

0.026

-0.048

-0.285

Median
Income

-0.248 -0.284

0.097

-0.019

-0.492

0.022

0.105

0.063

-0.231

0.683

-

Percent
Non-white

0.290

-0.144

0.118

0.721

0.042

-0.195

-0.073

0.360

-0.421

-0.634

Percent
Non-white

Median
Income

Percent
College
Educated

Total
Words

Total
Select

Candidate
Select

Total
Questions

Bilingual

Local
Questions

Candidate
Questions

Sheets

Pages

Pages

-

0.278

-

All correlations are found to be significant with a p-value < 0.0003. Bolded observations are considered highly correlated (>= |0.8|).
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To demonstrate which variables are included in each model, Table 3 shows which of
the discussed ballot length measurements and demographic variables are in the municipal
level and precinct level models. An ‘X’ indicates that the corresponding variable is not
included either due to collinearity or inapplicability given the model.
Table 3: Independent variables per model level
Independent Variables
Municipal Level
Precinct Level
Pages
✓
✓
Sheets
X
X
Candidate Questions
✓
✓
Local Questions
✓
✓
Bilingual
X
✓
Total Questions
X
X
Candidate Select
✓
✓
Total Select
X
X
Total Words
X
X
Percent College Educated
✓
✓
Median Income
✓
✓
Urbanicity
✓
X
Percent Non-white
✓
✓
Note: The checkmark indicates that the variable is included in the model. An ‘X’
indicates it was not included in the model.

Coding of Voting Error Types
In addition to the ballot length measurements, voting errors were defined and
categorized. The categorization of error types follows an integrated approach of systems
thinking and traditional ergonomics perspective. Errors are classified based on the system
elements (i.e., the human and the machine) or their interactions (i.e., human-machine
interaction) that cause the error occurrence (Meadows & Wright, 2015). In order to
classify each DS200 error code, the DS200 training manual (Election Systems and
Software, 2011, pp. 7-8) and the observation description generated by the scanner log
files were considered based on the perspective of occurrence. The categories of ‘No
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Error’ contains events that did not result in an error of any type (purple highlighted in
Figure 1). Any ballot scan that prompted voter interaction with the DS200 beyond the
traditional submission process is considered an error due to its potential impact on the
voting processes within a polling location (e.g., due to long lines, voter
disenfranchisement, distrust in the voting system). Physical errors that occurred while a
voter was interacting with the machine are classified as a ‘Human-Machine Interaction’
(HMI) error, such as “multiple ballots detected” or “ballot was not inserted far enough”
(Gautam & Singh, 2015). Errors that occur due to the programming of the machine or
due to the device’s functionality are classified as ‘Machine’ errors (e.g., “ballot jam”,
“error scanning ballot”, “ballot could not be read”) (Gautam & Singh, 2015). The final
classification is ‘Marking’ error which contains events that were caused by inappropriate
pen markings made or ballot accepted/rejected by the voters. ‘Marking’ errors may be
caused by creating marks on restricted areas of the ballot (unreadable marks), marking
too many selections for a single question (e.g., voter accepted/rejected overvoted ballot),
or leaving the ballot blank (e.g., voter accepted/rejected blank ballot) (see Appendix E).
From an ergonomics perspective, ‘Marking’ errors are considered physical or cognitive
shortfalls between the voter and the ballot or between the voter and the method of
marking.
It is important to note that the 2018 RI Midterm DS200 logs were not programmed to
retain information regarding undervotes, thus this error was unable to be included in this
study given this dataset.
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Statistical Methods
Two steps were used in performing this analysis: 1) Pearson’s correlation tests and 2)
logistic regression modeling. The correlation testing was used to select which of the
possible ballot length and demographic variables were included in the models. Two logistic
regression models (i.e., binary response and multinomial unordered response) are
described at two geographic levels (i.e., municipal and precinct) as they were used
throughout the analysis of voting error. For each model type at each level of analysis,
independent variables and dependent variables are classified.
Pearson’s correlation testing was performed within and between all ballot length
variables and municipal level demographic variables, as well as within and between all
ballot length variables and precinct level demographic variables. Variables were
considered highly correlated if their correlation coefficient was equal to or exceeded 0.8.
The maximum alpha value allowed to reject the null hypothesis for the Pearson’s
correlation test was 0.0003. This value was adjusted using the Bonferroni correction
method with the original alpha being 0.05 and a total of 158 test performed (0.05/158 =
0.0003).
To investigate the relationship between ballot length and voting errors, regression
analyses are conducted once the data cleaning and correlation tests were performed.
Literature in voting research exploring voting errors has used several forms of regression
models to explore independent variable effects on continuous dependent variables (Milita,
2017; Kimball & Kropf, 2005; Herrnson, Hanmer, & Niemi, 2012; Hamilton & Ladd,
1996). In this paper, two approaches are used to measure the response: binary (i.e., no error
and error) and categorical (i.e., whether errors occur and what types of errors occur),
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indicating the need for multiple logistic regression models. These models are used strictly
to explore the relationship between ballot length metrics and voting errors as they occurred
in the 2018 RI Midterm elections at the municipal level and precinct level. This
combination of two types of dependent variable classification (i.e., binary and categorical)
and geographic level (i.e., municipality and precinct) will result in four logistic regression
models and eight unique regression equations with controls for voter demographics.
Each model quantifies the impact of ballot length (i.e., independent variables) on the
odds of encountering a voting error (i.e., dependent variable) at different levels of
granularity. First, the general models were created considering the dependent variable as a
binary response where the occurrence of any type of voting error is considered an event (1)
and ‘No Error’ observations are considered non-events (0). Differentiated models were
created representing events in a multinomial, unordered manner where the error types (i.e.,
‘Machine’, and ‘Marking’, and ‘HMI’) are treated independently and compared against the
non-event (i.e., ‘No Error’) observations. The two differentiated models each resulted in
three regression equations, one for each error type, using the non-event (i.e., ‘No Error’)
observations as a reference model (Wang, 2005). Additional, aggregated voter
demographics are controlled for in both models at the municipal level and precinct level.
The general and differentiated models were created in R-Studio using the ‘glm’
function from the ‘stats’ package and the ‘multinom’ function from the ‘nnet’ package,
respectively. The resulting coefficients (i.e., the log odds) of the multiple logistic
regression models are converted into the percent change in the odds of an event (i.e., a
voting error) occurring to express the impact of each variable. Variables were considered
significant if their p-values exceeded a Bonferroni corrected alpha value of 0.0003.
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Results
Overview of Voting Error Rates
The error rates observed in the DS200 log files during the 2018 Midterm election in
RI are presented in Table 4. While over 90% of scans resulted in ‘No Error’, there are
relatively large rates of error (7.06%) given the context of events. ‘Marking’ errors are
the most frequently occurring of the error types at 4.29%, with ‘HMI’ and ‘Machine’
errors each representing 1.21% and 1.56% of the total scanning events, respectively.
Table 4: Overall error rates by error type in the 2018 RI Midterm election
Error Type
Error Rate
HMI
1.21%
Machine
1.56%
Marking
4.29%
No Error
92.94%

Analysis of the General Models
The general models were applied to the data using the binary response for voting error
first analyzing at the municipal level (Table 5) and then at the precinct level (Table 6).

Municipal Level General Model
Table 5 presents the results of the municipal level general model, indicating the
significant ballot length variables as ‘Pages’ (p-value = 3.92e-07), ‘Local Questions’ (pvalue = 4.14e-09) and ‘Candidate Select’ (p-value = 0.000). ‘Pages’, ‘Local Questions’,
and ‘Candidate Select’ in the precinct level general model demonstrate an increase in the
odds of error as their metrics increase by one unit, thus an increase of one page increases
the odds of an error by 8.590%, an increase of one ‘Local Question’ increases the odds of
an error by 1.609%, whereas an additional ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity increases the
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odds of error by 2.893%. Of the demographic variables in the municipal level general
model, ‘Median Income’ (p-value = 1.92e-07) and ‘Urbanicity’ (p-value = 8.08e-10) are
significant. The results show that as ‘Median Income’ increases by one dollar, the odds of
error are reduced by 0.0005%. As ‘Urbanicity’ is increased by one percent, the odds of
error are increased by 26.838%. The remaining ballot length variable ‘Candidate
Questions’ and the remaining municipal level demographic variables ‘Percent College
Educated’ and ‘Percent Non-white’ are not significant in the municipal level general
model.
Table 5: Municipal level general model results
Variable

Coefficient
Estimate

Percent
Change in
Odds

Standard
Error

Z value

Intercept

-2.998

-95.010

0.104

-28.756

0.000

***

Pages

0.082

8.590

0.016

5.073

3.92e-07

***

Candidate
Questions

0.004

-0.418

0.005

-0.772

0.440

Local Questions

0.016

1.609

0.003

5.878

4.14e-09

***

Candidate Select

0.029

2.893

0.002

13.114

0.000

***

Percent College
Educated

-0.004

-0.396

0.001

-3.404

6.63e-4

Median Income

-5.04e-06

-5.04e-04

9.67e-07

-5.207

1.92e-07

***

Urbanicity

0.238

26.838

0.039

6.143

8.08e-10

***

Percent Non-white

0.000

0.025

0.001

0.310

0.757

p-value

Significance Codes: p-value < 0.0003 (‘*’); p-value < 0.00006 (‘**’); p-value < 0.000006 (‘***’) (Bonferroni
corrected)

The results of both the municipal level and precinct level general models are used to
test hypotheses H1 independently. In the municipal level general model, the ballot length
variables ‘Pages’, ‘Local Questions’, and ‘Candidate Select’ reject the null hypothesis (i.e.,
increasing measures of ballot length increase the odds of voting errors). The remaining
ballot length variable in the model (i.e., ‘Candidate Questions’) fails to reject the null
21

hypothesis as it demonstrates no significant impact on the odds of voting errors at the
municipal level.

Precinct Level General Model
Table 6 presents the results of the precinct level general model, indicating the
significant ballot length variables are ‘Candidate Questions’ (p-value = 2.28e-04), ‘Local
Questions’ (p-value = 0.000), ‘Bilingual’ (p-value = 1.34e-05), and ‘Candidate Select’ (pvalue = 0.000). The significant ballot length variables, aside from ‘Candidate Questions’,
demonstrate an increase in the odds of error as their metrics increase by one unit. The
variable ‘Candidate Questions’ demonstrates a decrease in the odds of error as its
measure increases by one unit. As the number of candidate question increases by one, the
odds of an error decrease by 1.898%. An increase of one local question increases the
odds of an error by 2.024%. A ballot that is distributed in a ‘Bilingual’ format increases
the odds of error by 12.114%. An additional ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity increases the
odds of error by 2.932%. Of the demographic variables in the precinct level general
model, ‘Percent College Educated’ (p-value = 0.000) and ‘Median Income’ (p-value =
0.000) are significant. The results show that as ‘Percent College Educated’ increases by
one unit, the odds of error are reduced by 0.886%. As ‘Median Income’ is increased by
one dollar, the odds of error are increased by 0.00015%. The remaining variables ‘Pages’
and ‘Percent Non-white’ are not significant in the precinct level general model.
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Table 6: Precinct level general model results
Variable

Coefficient
Estimate

Percent
Change in
Odds

Standard
Error

Z value

Intercept

-2.892

-94.451

0.075

-38.489

0.000

Pages

0.036

3.416

0.016

2.081

0.037

Candidate
Questions

-0.019

-1.898

0.005

-3.685

2.28e-04

*

Local Questions

0.020

2.024

0.003

7.413

0.000

***

Bilingual

0.114

12.114

0.026

4.354

1.34e-05

***

Candidate Select

0.020

2.932

0.002

14.836

0.000

**

Percent College
Educated

-0.009

-0.886

0.001

-14.616

0.000

***

Median Income

1.54e-06

1.54e-04

5.02e-07

3.063

0.000

***

Percent Non-white

0.006

0.583

0.001

9.357

0.002

p-value
***

Significance Codes: p-value < 0.0003 (‘*’); p-value < 0.00006 (‘**’); p-value < 0.000006 (‘***’) (Bonferroni
corrected)

At the precinct level, hypothesis H1 is tested for all ballot length variables. The
significant ballot length variables ‘Local Questions’, ‘Bilingual’, and ‘Candidate Select’
reject the null hypothesis as an increase of one unit in each measure increases the odds of
experiencing voting errors (Table 6). The variables ‘Pages’ and ‘Candidate Questions’
fail to reject the null hypothesis, as ‘Pages’ demonstrates no significant impact on the
odds of voting error and ‘Candidate Questions’ reduces the odds of error as its measure
increases.

Analysis of the Differentiated Model
Within the differentiated models, effects are separated by error type (i.e., Marking,
Machine, and HMI) with the ‘No Error’ observations as a reference event. Table 7 and

23

Table 9 present the results of the differentiated model at the municipal level and the results
of the precinct level, respectively.

Municipal Level Differentiated Model
The municipal level differentiated model, shown in Table 7, identifies that all ballot
length variables and municipal level demographic variables significantly impact the odds
of ‘HMI’ errors occurring (all p-values = 0.000). Of the ballot length variables, an increase
of one page increases the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 160.862%, an additional candidate-based
question reduces the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 0.773%, an additional local question reduces
the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 7.087%, and an additional ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity
increases the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 2.832%. Of the municipal level demographic
variables, an increase in the ‘Percent College Educated’ of one percent increases the odds
of ‘HMI’ errors by 0.214%, an increase in ‘Median Income’ of one dollar reduces the odds
of ‘HMI’ errors by 0.001%, an increase in ‘Urbanicity’ of one percent increases the odds
of ‘HMI’ errors by 36.680%, and an increase in ‘Percent Non-white’ of one percent reduces
the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 1.321%.
The municipal level differentiated model results indicate that all ballot length variables
significantly impact ‘Machine’ errors (all with p-value = 0.000). Of these variables, an
increase of one page reduces the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 5.261%, an increase of one
candidate-based question increases the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 4.501%, an increase of
one local question increases the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 4.440%, and an increase of
one ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity reduces the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 6.669%. Of
the municipal level demographic variables, ‘Percent College Educated’, ‘Median Income’,
and ‘Urbanicity’ are significant with equal p-values of 0.000. The demographic variable
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‘Percent Non-white’ is not significant in the model (p-value = 3.82e-04). The model
identifies that an increase in ‘Percent College Educated’ by one percent increases the odds
of ‘Machine’ errors by 1.343%, an increase in ‘Median Income’ of one dollar decreases
the odds of ‘Machine’ error by 0.00078%, and an increase in ‘Urbanicity’ of one percent
increases the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 0.147%.
Within the municipal level differentiated model, the odds of ‘Marking’ errors occurring
are significantly impacted by all ballot length variables with equal p-values of 0.000.
Within this regression, an increase of one page reduces the odds of ‘Marking’ errors by
9.462%, an increase of one candidate-based question reduces the odds of ‘Marking’ errors
by 1.532%, an increase of one local question increases the odds of ‘Marking’ errors by
2.747%, and an additional ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity increases the odds of ‘Marking’
errors by 5.456%. Of the municipal level demographic variables included in this
differentiated model, the variables ‘Percent College Educated’, ‘Median Income’,
‘Urbanicity’, and ‘Percent Non-white’ are all significant with p-values of 0.000. An
increase in ‘Percent College Educated’ by one percent reduces the odds of ‘Marking’ errors
by 0.882%, an increase in ‘Median Income’ of one dollar reduces the odds of ‘Marking’
errors by 0.000025%, an increase in ‘Urbanicity’ of one percent increases the odds of
‘Marking’ errors by 24.853%, and an increase in ‘Percent Non-white’ of one percent
increases the odds of ‘Marking’ errors by 0.371%.
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Table 7: Municipal level differentiated model results.
Variable

HMI Error
Percent
Change in
p-value
Odds

Machine Error
Percent
Change in
p-value
Odds

Marking Error
Percent
Change in
p-value
Odds

Intercept

-99.785

0.000

***

-96.706

0.000

***

-96.720

0.000

***

Pages

160.862

0.000

***

-5.261

0.000

***

-9.462

0.000

***

Candidate
Questions

-0.773

0.000

***

4.501

0.000

***

-1.532

0.000

***

Local Questions

-7.087

0.000

***

4.440

0.000

***

2.747

0.000

***

Candidate Select

2.832

0.000

***

-6.669

0.000

***

5.456

0.000

***

Percent College
Educated

0.214

0.000

***

1.343

0.000

***

-0.882

0.000

***

Median Income

-0.001

0.000

***

-7.80e-04

0.000

***

-2.50e-5

0.000

***

Urbanicity

36.680

0.000

***

0.147

0.000

***

24.853

0.000

***

Percent Non-1.321
0.000 ***
-0.219
3.82e-04
0.371
0.000
***
white
Significance Codes: p-value < 0.0003 (‘*’); p-value < 0.00006 (‘**’); p-value < 0.000006 (‘***’) (Bonferroni corrected)

Hypothesis H1 is assessed for the municipal level differentiated model. Within each
error type’s regression in this model, H1 is assessed by variable, as no regression
demonstrates a unanimous increase in the odds of voting errors with an increase in ballot
length. Table 8 displays the direction of the impact on the odds of error for each regression
within the municipal level differentiated model.
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Table 8: Directionality of municipal level differentiated model effects.
Variable
HMI
Machine

Marking

Intercept

-

-

-

Pages

+

-

-

Candidate Questions

-

+

-

Local Questions

-

+

+

Candidate Select

+

-

+

Percent College
Educated

+

+

-

Median Income

-

-

-

Urbanicity

+

+

+

Percent Non-white

-

N/A

+

Note: (+) increase in the odds of error, (-) decrease in the odds of error, (N/A)
variable not significant.
With respect to ‘HMI’ errors, the variables ‘Pages’ and ‘Candidate Select’ reject the
null hypothesis, as they increase the odds of ‘HMI’ errors when each variable’s value
increases. The variables ‘Candidate Questions’ and ‘Local Questions’ fail to reject the null
hypothesis as they do not increase the odds of ‘HMI’ errors as their values increase.
For ‘Machine’ errors in the municipal level differentiated model, the null hypothesis is
rejected for the variables ‘Candidate Questions’ and ‘Local Questions’. The ballot length
variables ‘Pages’ and ‘Candidate Select’ fail to reject the null hypothesis as they decrease
the odds of error as their values increase.
Within the ‘Marking’ error regression, the ballot length variables ’Local Questions’
and ‘Candidate Select’ reject the null hypothesis due to their increase in the odds of
‘Marking’ errors as their values increase. The variables ‘Pages’ and ‘Candidate Questions’
fail to reject the null hypothesis due to their decrease in the odds of ‘Marking’ errors as
their values increase.
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Precinct Level Differentiated Model
The precinct level differentiated model shown in Table 9 identifies the impact of ballot
length and precinct level demographics on ‘HMI’, ‘Machine’, and ‘Marking’ errors,
independently.
With respect to ‘HMI’ errors in the precinct level differentiated model, all ballot length
variables are significant (p-values = 0.000). Of the significant ballot length variables, an
increase of one page increases the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 125.650%, an increase of one
candidate-based question reduces the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 4.676%, an additional local
question reduces the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 6.293%, a ‘Bilingual’ formatted ballot
increases the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 26.954%, and an increase of one ‘Candidate Select’
opportunity increases the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 3.346%. Of the significant precinct level
demographic variables, an increase in ‘Percent College Educated’ of one percent reduces
the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 1.299%, an increase in ‘Median Income’ of one dollar
increases the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 0.000198%, and an increase in ‘Percent Non-white’
of one percent reduces the odds of ‘HMI’ errors by 0.342%.
With respect to ‘Machine’ errors, the precinct level differentiated model indicates that
all ballot length variables are significant (p-values = 0.000). Of the significant ballot length
variables, an increase of one page reduces the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 16.067%, an
increase of one candidate-based question increases the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by
0.588%, an increase of one local question increases the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by
5.003%, a ‘Bilingual’ formatted ballot reduces the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 6.698%,
and an additional ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity reduces the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by
4.696%. Of the included precinct level demographic variables, ‘Percent College Educated’
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and ‘Percent Non-white’ are significant with equal p-values of 0.000 and ‘Median Income’
is significant with a p-value of 5.66e-08. As demonstrated in Table 9, an increase in
‘Percent College Educated’ of one percent reduces the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by 0.263%,
an increase in ‘Median Income’ of one dollar increases the odds of ‘Machine’ errors by
0.000129%, and an increase in ‘Percent Non-white’ of one percent increases the odds of
‘Machine’ errors by 0.681%.
Investigating ‘Marking’ errors in the precinct level differentiated model indicates that
all ballot length variables are significant in the model (p-values = 0.000). Among the
significant ballot length variables, an increase of one page reduces the odds of ‘Marking’
errors by 7.220%, an increase of one candidate-based question reduces the odds of
‘Marking’ errors by 3.226%, an increase of one local question increases the odds of
‘Marking’ errors by 2.718%, a ‘Bilingual’ formatted ballot reduces the odds of ‘Marking’
errors by 2.401%, and an additional ‘Candidate Select’ opportunity increases the odds of
‘Marking’ errors by 5.620%. Of the precinct level demographic variables, all but ‘Median
Income’ are significant with p-values of 0.000. An increase in ‘Percent College Educated’
of one percent reduces the odds of ‘Marking’ errors by 0.926%, an increase in ‘Percent
Non-white’ of one percent increases the odds of ‘Marking’ errors by 1.027%.
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Table 9: Precinct level differentiated model results.
HMI Error

Machine Error
Percent
Change
in Odds

Marking Error

Variable

Percent
Change in
Odds

Intercept

-99.739

0.000

***

-95.879

0.000

***

-96.708

0.000

***

Pages

125.650

0.000

***

-16.067

0.000

***

-7.220

0.000

***

Candidate
Questions

-4.676

0.000

***

0.588

0.000

***

-3.226

0.000

***

Local Questions

-6.293

0.000

***

5.003

0.000

***

2.718

0.000

***

Bilingual

26.954

0.000

***

-6.698

0.000

***

-2.401

0.000

***

Candidate Select

3.346

0.000

***

-4.696

0.000

***

5.620

0.000

***

Percent College
Educated

-1.299

0.000

***

-0.263

0.000

***

-0.926

0.000

***

Median Income

1.98e-4

1.56e-10

***

1.29e-4

5.66e-08

***

1.20e-4

0.002

p-value

Percent
Change
in Odds

p-value

p-value

Percent Non-0.342
8.76e-09 ***
0.681
0.000
***
1.027
0.000
***
white
Significance Codes: p-value < 0.0003 (‘*’); p-value < 0.00006 (‘**’); p-value < 0.000006 (‘***’) (Bonferroni corrected)

Within each error type’s regression in the precinct level differentiated model, H1 is
assessed per variable, as no regression demonstrates a unanimous increase in the odds of
voting errors with an increase in ballot length. Table 10 displays the direction of the impact
on the odds of error for each regression within the model.
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Table 10: Directionality of precinct level differentiated model effects.
HMI
Machine
Variable

Marking

Intercept

-

-

-

Pages

+

-

-

Candidate Questions

-

+

-

Local Questions

-

+

+

Bilingual

+

-

-

Candidate Select

+

-

+

Percent College
Educated

-

-

-

Median Income

+

+

N/A

Percent Non-white

-

+

+

Note: (+) increase in the odds of error, (-) decrease in the odds of error, (N/A)
variable not significant.

The variables ‘Pages’, ‘Bilingual’, and ‘Candidate Select’ reject the null hypothesis for
the ‘HMI’ error regression. The variables ‘Candidate Questions’ and ‘Local Questions’ fail
to reject the null hypothesis for the ‘HMI’ regression as an increase in their measure
demonstrated a decrease in the odds of ‘HMI’ errors.
Within the ‘Machine’ error regression, the variables ‘Candidate Questions’ and ‘Local
Questions’ reject the null hypothesis. For each of these variables, an increase in their
measure results in an increase in the odds of ‘Machine’ errors. The variables ‘Pages’,
‘Bilingual’, and ‘Candidate Select’ fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Within the ‘Marking’ error regression, the variables ‘Local Questions’ and ‘Candidate
Select’ reject the null hypothesis. The variables ‘Pages’, ‘Candidate Questions’, and
‘Bilingual’ fail to reject the null hypothesis for the ‘Marking’ regression in the precinct
level differentiated model.
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Discussion

Measures of ballot length impact specific types of voting errors (i.e., HMI, Machine,
Marking), although the directionality and magnitude of these effects vary. These findings
agree with the general implication of Selb (2008) which indicate that ballot length impacts
voting systems. While research question one (R1) is answered, that ballot length does
indeed impact voting errors, research question two (R2) must be addressed per model (i.e.,
the general model and differentiated model) at both the municipal and precinct levels.
The findings that some elements of ballot length increase the odds of voting error are
consistent, providing insight into answering research question R1. These models
demonstrate that ballot length does impact the odds of experiencing voting errors.
Additionally, the directionality and magnitude of ballot length effects are determined from
a general perspective, thus partially addressing research question R2. However, there are
differences between the municipal level and precinct level general models regarding these
impact magnitudes and direction. Where the models agree is in their significance and
direction of some demographic variables. This indicates that, in general, areas with
demographics that corresponded with commonly under-resourced communities (i.e., low
percent college educated, low median income, and high urbanicity) experienced more
voting errors regardless of ballot length during the 2018 RI Midterm election. With this
information, resource allocation by election officials can be adjusted to provide additional
personnel and equipment to municipalities that might require it in future elections.
With respect to ballot length, the municipal level general model results specifically
indicate that increases in ‘Pages’, ‘Local Questions’, and/or ‘Candidate Select’
opportunities increase the odds of voting errors. Considering the error rates in Table 4,
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approximately 7.06% of scans in RI contained an error. The municipal level general model
implies that the addition of a single ballot page across RI would increase the odds of voting
errors by 8.590%, indicating an increase in error rate to 7.666%. The impact on the odds
of voting errors in the municipal level general model from ‘Urbanicity’ would increase the
error rate from 7.06% to 8.955% with an additional ‘Urbanicity’ percentage point. This
model suggests that municipalities that have highly populated urban areas and
municipalities that distributed longer ballots, with respect to the number of pages, local
questions, and candidate selections, experienced significantly higher odds of voting errors
during the 2018 RI Midterm election. Considering this investigation focused on a RI
election, the high population density of the state may explain the large impact of
‘Urbanicity’. With up to 3,000 voters assigned to a single polling location in RI, areas that
are more densely populated/have higher ‘Urbanicity’ experience more heavily used
equipment and more opportunities for error (i.e., more users of the system). To avoid
potential delays caused by these errors in future elections, additional resources (i.e., poll
workers and voting equipment) may be allocated to municipalities with long ballots and
high urbanicity. However, future research should explore whether urbanicity is truly a
function of population density when investigating voting error or if the impact is caused by
the number of voters per piece of voting equipment. In order to explore urbanicity more in
depth, cross-state and cross-election investigations must be performed.
The issue with this recommendation becomes that the overall capacity and layout
planning that is or is not able to accommodate increases in resource allocation. As more
poll workers and more voting equipment are allocated to a municipality, additional physical
space is required which, in turn, could require more polling locations within a municipality.
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Locating available space for more polling locations within urban areas continues to be a
challenge that confronts election officials across the U.S. with various options being
electronic voting (i.e., eliminating polling locations all together, which continues to be a
very unpopular idea), voting centers (i.e., central, larger locations where resources can be
vast and effectively used while serving larger active voter populations), vote by mail, or
even universal polling locations in which any voter can cast a ballot at any polling location
within a particular state. Essentially, this has a two-fold meaning. First, that using ‘Rules
of Thumb’ that are developed statewide are not applicable to every municipality or precinct
and models that decisions are being made from must continue to consider all variables
together in a robust manner in a continuous improvement perspective. And second, that
data from technology can be utilized as valuable inputs into these decision-making
processes and resource allocation models to eliminate the need for ineffective proxies of
polling place performance and resource needs.
An interesting component of this outcome is the fact that these are errors at only one
station of the voting system on a specific type of voting equipment (i.e., digital ballot
scanners). There are multitudes of opportunities to use data to directly feed into the
decision-making loop to continuously improve the models through every election in order
to advance these models, such as incorporating data generated by electronic poll books or
DREs. Additional research must explore resource allocation models and their current
effectiveness, as well as the impact of incorporating other input variables, such as those
described in this research, based on reducing errors.
Within the precinct level general model, the ballot length variables ‘Local Questions’
and ‘Candidate Select’ increase the odds of voting errors as their measures increase.
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Additionally, ‘Bilingual’ ballots led to higher odds of error than single language ballots.
The ‘Local Questions’ and ‘Candidate Select’ variables represent opportunities for voters
to mark the ballot. As more voter interaction is required with the ballot, the odds that an
error will occur are expected to increase. Interestingly in this model, despite controlling for
the non-white population, ‘Bilingual’ ballots have a large impact on the odds of voting
errors by a 12.114% increase. Bilingual ballots (Appendix B), on average, tend to be quite
long by several measures of ballot length when compared to single language ballots. In the
2018 RI Midterm election, the average number of words on a bilingual ballot was 1942
compared to the average number of words on a single language ballot of 860. Additionally,
the average number of pages for bilingual ballots was 2.98 compared to an average of 2.07
pages for single language ballots. These longer ballot properties that are associated with
bilingual ballots may have caused the increased odds of errors during the 2018 RI Midterm
election. Additionally, bilingual ballots are distributed in areas with higher non-English
speaking populations. This may indicate a population that is less experienced with the
voting process, which may also lead to increased odds of voting errors.
Other potential reasons for the impact of bilingual ballots could be the translation
accuracy, the complex and legalese language use in many ballot measures and this
interaction with non-English languages, or education about bilingual ballots in general. The
impact of bilingual ballots on voting errors presents a critical point of focus as bilingual
and multilingual ballots are mandated by law. If more municipalities begin to exceed the
threshold for single language ballots, then these errors have the potential to propagate and
lead to more serious issues; though, not necessarily due to multilingual ballots themselves,
but the properties that are associated with them. Within ballot design research, focusses

35

have been on the format of a ballot (e.g., selection method, paper ballot, digital ballot)
(Hamilton & Ladd, 1996; Everett, Byrne, & Greene, 2006), the layout of the ballot (e.g.,
the order of candidates, the order of questions, where instructions are on the page) (Kimball
& Kropf, 2003; Kimball & Kropf, 2005), and the design of the ballot (e.g., bolding of
words, language complexity) (Redish, Chisnell, Laskowski, & Lowry, 2010). The results
of the precinct level general model indicate the need to also focus on methods of presenting
information in multiple languages, such as using bilingual ballots and facsimile ballots, to
determine which formats mitigate effects on voting error rates.
At the precinct level, the length of the ballot significantly increased the odds of voting
errors after controlling for precinct level demographics during the 2018 RI Midterm
election. With this information, precincts that distribute longer ballots, with respect to the
number of ‘Local Questions’ and ‘Candidate Select’ opportunities as well as ballots in a
‘Bilingual’ format may consider performing narrower investigations into the design of
ballots. Techniques for survey design may be a helpful resource to accommodate the large
amount of information often presented on Midterm and General election ballots. Additional
resource allocation techniques may be required that consider traditionally unincluded
factors or that more scientifically assess the traditionally included factors. Another
component that must be considered is the level of experience that voters have with
elections, in general, as well as with a specific ballot design/format or voting equipment.
Assessing both the municipal level and precinct level differentiated models generates
insight regarding research questions R1. The general models’ findings: ballot length does
significantly impact the odds of experiencing voting errors. The differentiated models also
provide more specific answers to research question R2: depending on the error type and
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the measure of ballot length, the odds of voting errors may be increased or decreased.
Comparing the municipal level and precinct level differentiated models indicates that the
odds of ‘HMI’ errors are consistently increased by measures of ballot length (i.e., the
number of pages and the number of candidate select opportunities). Additionally, the
municipal level model indicates that ‘Urbanicity’ contributes to increases in voting errors
of all types. In both models, as certain measures of ballot length increase, the odds of
experiencing errors are reduced. These effects may be explained by external variables (e.g.,
voter behavior, level of voting experience, equipment maintenance frequency, other
unincluded demographic data).
Within the municipal level differentiated model, error types (i.e., ‘HMI’, ‘Machine’,
and ‘Marking’) are investigated independently while controlling for municipal level
demographics. The model identifies that the odds of ‘HMI’ errors are increased by
increases in ‘Pages’ (a 160.862% increase in the odds of ‘HMI’ error), ‘Candidate Select’
opportunities (a 2.832% increase in the odds of ‘HMI’ error), and ‘Urbanicity’ (a 36.680%
increase in the odds of ‘HMI’ error). In other words, areas that distributed ballots with
several pages, more candidate selection opportunities, and/or had high urbanicity
experienced more errors when voters attempted to insert their ballot into the DS200.
Assessing this impact in terms of the overall 2018 RI Midterm election, the experienced
‘HMI’ error rate (i.e., 1.21%) (Table 4) would increase to 3.16%, more than doubling the
number of affected voters, if an additional page is added to each ballot. With a single
additional percentage point of ‘Urbanicity’, the state wide ‘HMI’ error rate would increase
from 1.21% to 1.65%. ‘Local Questions’ also has a large impact on ‘HMI’ errors, reducing
their odds by 7.087% when an additional ‘Local Questions’ is listed on the ballot. On its
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own, there is not much meaning behind this effect, although municipalities that distributed
ballots with many local questions during the 2018 RI Midterm election may have shared a
trait

that

confounds

the

‘Local

Questions’

variable

(e.g.,

a

more

voting

involved/experienced population).
These findings indicate that the number of ballot pages and the urbanicity of an area
impact the odds of ‘HMI’ errors and therefore require special consideration when preparing
for elections. This impact on ‘HMI’ error may indicate insufficient voter education
materials regarding how to use the ballot scanner. Studies can be conducted in areas that
have high rates of ‘HMI’ errors and areas that have several ballot pages and high urbanicity
to better understand their underlying relationship. Feedback from voters may also provide
insight into why these errors occur.
With respect to ‘Machine’ errors in the municipal level differentiated model,
‘Candidate Questions’ and ‘Local Questions’ have the largest impacts (a 4.501% increase
and 4.440% increase, respectively). In addition to ballot length, all municipal level
demographics, excluding ‘Percent Non-white’, present significant impacts on the odds of
‘Machine’ errors. These finding indicate the need to investigate the ballot scanners in active
use during real elections. There may be issues with equipment maintenance or an inherent
sensitivity to longer ballots that lead to ‘Machine’ errors. In depth testing of these devices
should be performed and compared to test results reported by device manufacturers as well
as testing facilities employed by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Other
investigation should be performed to compare the equipment distributed to different types
of areas throughout a region to ensure that the level of maintenance and accuracy of the
devices is consistent regardless of area specific demographics.
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Within the ‘Marking’ error regression, the ballot length variables ‘Local Questions’
and ‘Candidate Select’ increase the odds of ‘Marking’ errors as their measures increase.
However, increases in ‘Pages’ and ‘Candidate Questions’ significantly reduce the odds of
‘Marking’ errors. Within this model, ‘Urbanicity’ increases the odds of ‘Marking’ errors
by 24.853% as ‘Urbanicity’ increases by one percentage point. The increase in the odds of
‘Marking’ errors due to ‘Local Questions’ and ‘Candidate Select’ indicates that as voters
interact with a ballot more, their odds of mismarking a ballot increase. Additional causes
may be from confusion with the wording of local questions, which often include more
legalese than candidate questions (Reilly & Richey, 2011; Milita, 2017), and/or from
confusion from the instructions for multiselect candidate questions. Within several
candidate-based questions on a ballot, the voter can select more than one candidate whereas
on other candidate-based and local questions, marking more than one selection is
considered an error. This contradictory instruction may be a source of confusion for voters.
Additional research can assist with identifying specific sources of ‘Marking’ error. This
error type is one of the most concerning as it implies the possibility that voters are not able
to accurately portray their intentions on the ballot (Redish, Chisnell, Laskowski, & Lowry,
2010; Herrnson, Hanmer, & Niemi, 2012).
The municipal level differentiated model demonstrates that variables impacted different
types of errors uniquely. The model indicates that municipalities with several pages and
municipalities with a large percent of the population living in urban areas experienced
higher odds of encountering ‘HMI’ errors during the 2018 RI Midterm election. The effects
of these variables may indicate a need for revised resource allocation techniques and voter
education materials to ensure that areas with several page ballots and higher urbanicity can
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cast votes as equally as other areas. ‘Machine’ errors were more likely to occur in areas
with more ballot questions as well as areas with lower median incomes. These findings
may indicate that additional maintenance and testing methods for voting equipment may
be required for areas distributing longer ballots or in low income regions. Within the
‘Marking’ error regression, demographic variables such as ‘Urbanicity’ and ‘Median
Income’ significantly impacted the odds of experiencing ‘Marking’ errors during the 2018
RI Midterm election as well as the number of ‘Local Questions’ and ‘Candidate Select’
opportunities. These factors indicate that more research should be performed on the
effectiveness of voter education materials and the instructions provided on the ballot itself.
Other research may be performed on the level of assistance that is provided to voters that
may not understand how to properly mark a ballot or to investigate how often voters seek
assistance when marking a ballot.
Within the precinct level differentiated model, error types (i.e., ‘HMI’, ‘Machine’, and
‘Marking’) are investigated independently while controlling for precinct level
demographics. The model identifies that ‘HMI’ errors are increased by ‘Pages’ (a
125.650% increase in the odds of ‘HMI’ error), the ‘Bilingual’ ballot format (a 26.954%
increase in the odds of ‘HMI’ error), and ‘Candidate Select’ opportunities (a 3.346%
increase in the odds of ‘HMI’ error). As the number of ballot pages increase, voters must
feed additional ballot sheets into the scanner, providing more opportunities to incorrectly
insert the ballot. ‘Bilingual’ ballots also cause several ballot length measurements to
increase (i.e., questions are listed once in English and once in Spanish in the case of RI)
potentially leading to additional opportunities for ‘HMI’ errors. Assessing this impact with

40

respect to 2018 RI Midterm error rates, presented in Table 4, the 1.21% statewide ‘HMI’
error rate would increase to 2.73% if an additional page is added to each distributed ballot.
These impacts on the odds of ‘HMI’ errors indicates the tradeoff between longer ballots
and the rate of ‘HMI’ error. Despite longer ballots allowing for increased voter
participation, more voting errors may occur. While ‘HMI’ errors can be resolved by either
reinserting the ballot or remarking a new ballot, there is still the potential to disenfranchise
the voter and cause delays or lines in a polling location. Additional research is required to
determine the effectiveness of distributed instructions regarding how to properly scan a
ballot. During the 2018 RI Midterm elections, additional personnel was stationed at the
ballot scanning station in every precinct, however these errors are still present indicating
that voters may not be seeking help.
All ballot length variables also significantly impacted the odds of ‘Machine’ errors,
however only the variable ‘Local Questions’ largely increased the odds of ‘Machine’ errors
(a 5.003% increase). Considering the results of the precinct level differentiated model, there
may be an element of the scanning process that is uncaptured in the model, such as the
general capabilities of the DS200.
The ‘Marking’ error regression in the precinct level differentiated model indicated that
‘Local Questions’, ‘Candidate Select’ opportunities, and ‘Percent Non-white’ significantly
increased the odds of ‘Marking’ errors as their measures increase, agreeing with the
findings of the municipal level differentiated model. An interesting finding in this model is
that ‘Bilingual’ formatted ballots led to a decrease in the odds of ‘Marking’ errors by
2.401%, demonstrating the benefit of language accessible ballots. This effect of bilingual
ballots further indicates that additional research should investigate their design and use in

41

elections. While their importance in the democratic process is clear, there may be unnoticed
complications with the current methods of designing and/or implementing language
accessible ballots. A study into the format, design, and translation accuracy of bilingual
and multilingual ballots can provide insight into how to better accommodate low English
proficiency voters, as well as mitigate any effect these ballots may have on voting errors
in general.
The results of the precinct level differentiated model indicated that longer ballots
distributed during the election had the largest effect on the odds of ‘HMI’ errors. The
remaining error categories (i.e., ‘Machine’ and ‘Marking’) had their odds both increase and
decrease by different measures of ballot length which may indicate that these errors may
have had additional causes that must be considered in future analyses, such as equipment
specific characteristics, level of voter experience with a voting method, and/or the extent
and effectiveness of election education materials.
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Conclusion
The implications of these findings are that in the 2018 RI Midterm elections, voters in
municipalities with high urbanicity or in municipalities that distributed lengthy ballots
had larger odds of experiencing voting errors, specifically more human-machine
interaction (HMI) errors. Providing longer ballots increases the voter’s ability to
participate in democracy, although the consequence is an increase in voting errors which
can lead to long wait times and voter disenfranchisement (Everett, Byrne, & Greene,
2006; Ansolabehere & Shaw, 2016). This investigation into the 2018 RI Midterm election
indicates that, in areas with long ballots and high urbanicity, measures of ballot length
should be used to influence strategies in election preparation and resource allocation
techniques (e.g., polling places receive advanced voter education materials, additional
poll workers, and voting equipment). This research provides an initial understanding of
how ballot length impacted voting errors during the 2018 RI Midterm elections, stating
that there is evidence that ballot length increases the odds of experiencing voting errors,
regardless of location specific demographic. Although more work is required to fully
understand how voting errors occur and their impacts are on the voting system.
A limitation in this study is the method by which voting error is defined. Due to the
data source being an anonymous account of ballot scanning events, it is impossible to
determine a voter’s intention. For this reason, all overvotes and blank ballots were
considered voting errors regardless of voter intention. This limitation could be resolved by
performing controlled experiments in which participants are interviewed during or after the
scanning process to identify their intentions throughout the marking process. Additionally,
specific voter characteristics such as their level of experience with the ballot type or ballot
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scanner cannot be captured from the anonymous data. These factors may impact the odds
of experiencing voting errors, although must be observed via controlled experimentation
to protect voter anonymity. Another limitation within this analysis is that the undervote
voting error (i.e., when some questions on a ballot are not marked while others are) was
uncaptured by the DS200 for the 2018 RI Midterms. The method of data collection also
presents a limitation, as the election considered was a Midterm election. Therefore, the
results cannot be assumed to imply anything about other elections (e.g., General, Primary,
Special) as each election type has several points of variation (e.g., turnout, perceived
question importance, public awareness of the election).
With these limitations in mind, there is a plethora of future work that can build from
the analysis in this research article. By simply including additional variables regarding
ballot design and ballot measure information (i.e., the topic and information provided in a
question), additional models can be developed to assess how a ballot impacts the odds of
voting errors from a more holistic perspective. Additional research can also be conducted
for different types of elections as well as in controlled environments. By assessing and
comparing different election types, the most impactful errors across elections in general
can be identified. Controlled experiments allow for the collection of participant
demographic information which can also be recorded on a per participant basis and
matched with their scanning event rather than on an aggregate level such as in real
elections. With the inclusion of more specific demographic variables, a participant’s
history of voting, in depth ballot design variables, and ballot length variables, a more
comprehensive and descriptive model could be determined to generate and establish a
predictive model. While this research assesses data generated from the 2018 RI Midterm
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elections, the implications apply to elections in other states that use voting systems like
those used in RI. There are many other states that utilize paper ballots and scanners (e.g.,
North Carolina, Arizona, Nebraska) that have increased voter populations with different
demographic nuances, multiple urban areas per state and increased proportion of rural
areas, and even structural differences in decision making in terms of state verses
municipalities’ thus providing ample opportunities for comparative studies and
verification.
As demonstrated in ballot design and voting equipment literature, many voting systems
have flaws. Due to concerns of both election officials and voters regarding newer and
alternative voting systems, equipment use has begun to shift back to paper-based systems.
Overlooking the impact ballot length on voting systems can lead to an entirely new set of
concerns causing millions of voters to experience errors and delays throughout the voting
process, providing voters with a false sense of system failure. Election systems are complex
and, as technology changes, continue to grow in that complexity. Like any system, there
are many critical components in the elections system that must be investigated prior to the
accomplishment of a stable method for casting a vote. Rather than a continuous
development of new voting methods, investigations and improvements on the voting
methods that are currently in place across the U.S. are critical for voter trust, election
security, and resources. This work provides an analysis of a mostly unexplored area of
ballot research in the U.S. in assessing the effect of ballot length on voting error. This work
implores and seeks to spark more in-depth assessments of election systems currently in
place and the components that they are comprised of and how that impacts voter error
within an election system at all levels of government.
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Appendix A
Processed DS200 Log File Data Using BOOTH Voting Package
Duration
(mm:ss)
00:04
02:30
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:02
00:05
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:07
00:04
00:02
00:02
00:02
00:02
00:03
00:03
00:02
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:03
00:02

Scan Type

Ballot Cast Status

No Error
Ballot Jam. Please check the paper path.
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
Voter Accepted Blank Ballot
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
Voter Accepted Overvoted Ballot
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error
No Error

Successful
Jam
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
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Appendix B
Sample Ballot from the 2018 Rhode Island Midterm elections
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Appendix C
Ballot Length Metrics Data
Precin
ct
(Coded
)
1

Page
s

Sheet
s

2

1

Candida
te
Question
s
12

2

2

1

3

2

4

2

5

State
Questio
ns

Local
Questio
ns

Bilingu
al

Total
Questio
n

Candida
te Select

Total
Selec
t

Total
Word
s

3

3

0

18

15

21

729

12

3

3

0

18

15

21

729

1

12

3

3

0

18

15

21

729

1

12

3

3

0

18

15

21

729

2

1

12

3

3

0

18

15

21

729

6

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

7

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

8

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

9

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

10

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

11

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

12

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

13

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

14

2

1

13

3

0

0

16

19

22

627

15

2

1

11

3

0

0

14

18

21

614

16

2

1

11

3

0

0

14

18

21

614

17

2

1

11

3

0

0

14

18

21

614

18

2

1

11

3

0

0

14

18

21

614

19

2

1

11

3

0

0

14

18

21

614

20

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

21

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

22

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

23

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

24

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

25

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

26

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

27

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

28

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

29

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

30

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

31

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110

32

2

1

11

3

1

1

15

11

15

110
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Sample Set of Final Data Formatted

Appendix D

Appendix E
Ballot Scanner Codes, Categorization, and Observation Counts

No Error

Scanner Event Codes

Count

No Error

387233

Ballot Jam. Please check the paper path.

269

System Error - Contact Election Official.

8

Ballot Jam. Please remove ballot and re-insert.

71

Ballot Could Not Be Read. Please remove your ballot and re- 4229
insert the opposite end first.
Machine
Error

Event
Type

Marking
Error

Error scanning ballot. Please remove your ballot and re-insert 1677
the opposite end first. Ensure all stubs are removed from the
ballot.
Shutdown initiated

5

Ballot too short Please remove ballot.

19

Voting Machine Not Programmed For Your Ballot

236

Voter Rejected Overvoted Ballot

2159

Voter Accepted Overvoted Ballot

3147

Voter Rejected Blank Ballot

637

Voter Accepted Blank Ballot

1906

Automatically rejected Ballot with Unreadable mark

10014

Ballot was not inserted far enough. Please remove your ballot 675
and re-insert it completely.
HMI
Error

Ballot was removed during scanning. Please re-insert the 1678
ballot completely.
Multiple ballots were detected. Please remove ballots and 2694
insert them one ballot at a time. Ensure your ballot is not
folded or damaged.
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